Unlike many previous researchers, this paper will argue that the epistemological theories of Austrian Economists are incompatible with Objectivism and also inconsistent with the classical science paradigms associated with the Enlightenment.
There have been a number of papers comparing Objectivism to Austrian Economics. The motivation appears to be Rand’s relationship with Ludwig Von Mises, since both are known for advocating Laissez Faire Economics. Most of these papers have focused on ethics, particularly whether the subjective theory of value in Austrian Economics (AE) is consistent with Objectivists ethics. The majority of these papers have argued that AE (at least the Menger-Mises side) and Rand are actually very similar and compatible. In order to arrive at these conclusions, the authors have often provided nuanced explanations of what the Austrians or Rand said. For instance, Richard Johnsson argues:
It seems to be a well-established fact that there are similarities between Rand and Menger, despite the objectivist/subjectivist issue. Once we concede that something can be intrinsic value, in Moore’s sense, I believe the differences between Austrian subjectivism and Rand’s Objectivism vanish.[i]
Roderick Long concludes in his paper, Praxeology: Who Needs It:
I have argued that the features of Misesian praxeology that Rand found most objectionable—its aprioristic methodology, its value subjectivism, and its claims about motivational psychology—can be reinterpreted in ways that make them congenial to Rand’s philosophical principles while still preserving the essential points that Mises was seeking to make. Hence there is no reason for those of a Randian philosophical bent to deprive themselves of the powerful methodological instrument developed by Mises and his fellow Austrians: praxeology, the a priori science of human action.[ii]
And Ed Younkins argues:
“Objectivism’s Aristotelian perspective on the nature of man and the world and on the need to exercise one’s virtues can be viewed as complementary with the praxeology of Austrian economics.”[iii]
Objectivists are generally more critical of the Hayek branch of AE. For instance, David Kelley writes “if a defense of freedom depends on individualism, and individualism presupposes individuals capable of genuine self-direction, Hayek cannot successfully defend freedom.”[iv] Ed Younkins says this about Hayek, “Hayek is primarily concerned with the nature, scope, limits, use, and abuse of reason in human life. For Hayek, a man’s knowledge of the world and himself is at best limited, incomplete, and uncertain.”[v]
This paper will focus primarily on the similarities and differences of the epistemology of various Austrian Economists (Menger, Mises, Hayek) and Rand. Rand and the Austrian economists will be taken at their word. Unlike many previous researchers, this paper will argue that the epistemological theories of Austrian Economists are incompatible with Objectivism and also inconsistent with the classical science paradigms associated with the Enlightenment.
Menger lays out his epistemology in his book Investigations into the Method of Social Sciences.[vi] Lawrence H. White in the introduction to the book, explains.
Fortunately, Menger draws and even emphasizes a suitable distinction between the “realist-empirical orientation of theoretical research” and the “exact” orientation (p. 59). The search for so-called “exact laws” alone is more appropriately considered the task of purely theoretical research in economics. We can make sense of “exact laws” as theoretical propositions which (necessarily) take an “if-then” form: if conditions A and B hold, then condition C must also obtain. Menger rightly insists (pp. 70, 215) that realist-empirical generalizations (e.g., A and B are usually accompanied by C) can by their nature never attain the strictness that necessarily characterizes logical implications. The two sorts of “laws” are on different epistemological planes. So without too much dissent from Menger’s thought we may divide (or derive?) economic theory from economic history where he divided strict theory from what he considered an empirical sort of theory. What is empirical is really historical, and this accounts for its different status from what is deductive.[vii]
Lawrence H. White goes on to explain:
But this is not because, like some economists, he (Menger) sees empiricism or positivism or falsificationism as the only proper method for both social science and natural science. Instead he argues (p. 59 n. 18) that both the search for empirical regularities and the formulation of non-empirical, non-falsifiable (“exact”) theories are methods common to both economics and such natural science fields as chemistry. In viewing theoretical research in every field as having a non-empirical proposition at its core, Menger’s position bears some resemblance to that of modern philosophers of science. [viii]
As a person who has a masters degree in physics and a BS in Electrical Engineering and has worked with scientists and engineers his whole life, I am unaware of any so-called theoretical side of chemistry or other natural science that is ‘non-empirical, non-falsifiable (“exact”)’ nor have I ever heard such an idea proposed by others.
Ed Younkins describes Menger’s epistemology as:
Menger distinguishes between the empirical-realistic orientation to theory and the exact orientation to theory (36–44). Whereas the empirical-realistic branch of economics studies the regularities in the succession and coexistence of real phenomena, the exact orientation studies the laws governing ideal economic phenomena. He explains that empirical-realistic theory is concerned with regularities in the coexistence and succession of phenomena discovered by observing actual types and typical relationships of phenomena. Empirical realistic theory is subject to exceptions and to change over time. Theoretical economics in its realistic orientation derives empirical laws that are valid only for the spatial and temporal relationships from which they were observed. Empirical laws can only be alleged to be true within a particular spatiotemporal domain. The realistic orientation can only lead to real types and to the particular. The study of individual or concrete phenomena in time and space is the realm of the historical sciences.[ix]
Younkins and White both seem to agree that according to Menger there is theoretical side of economics that is exact and cannot be tested empirically. Menger argues there is also an empirical side of economics, which is not exact and subject to change over time.
Menger’s epistemology should be familiar as it is a restatement of the analytic-synthetic distinction. “Analytic propositions are true by virtue of their meaning, while synthetic propositions are true by how their meaning relates to the world.”[x] Not surprisingly the origin of this distinction can be found in Kant and comes from his metaphysics, in which he argues there is a noumenal and phenomenal realm.[xi] The noumenal realm is a realm of pure ideas and phenomenal world is a realm where our senses are engaged. This logically gives rise to an epistemological analytic-synthetic distinction.
Menger seems to argue that theoretical laws of economics can be derived by just thinking about them. Somehow these theoretical laws can tell us something empirical about economics.
Leonard Peikoff states, “The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy presents men with the following choice: If your statement is proved, it says nothing about that which exists; if it is about existents, it cannot be proved.” Menger seems to disagree with at least the analytic (theoretical) side. Menger seems to argue that theoretical laws of economics can be derived by just thinking about them. Somehow these theoretical laws can tell us something empirical about economics. Whether that is true or not, it is not consistent with Objectivist epistemology and it is not science. The philosophy of science is in ruins now that Karl Popper is supposed to be the foremost philosopher of science and the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics appears to undermine objectivity and even the law of identity. However, even these deviations in the philosophy of science do not suggest that science can be divorced from empirical evidence.
Mises’ epistemology is described in his praxeology, which is supposed to be the study of human action. The Action Axiom is the fundamental starting point of praxeology and it states “that individual human beings act, that is, on the primordial fact that individuals engage in conscious actions toward chosen goals.”[xii] According to Mises the principles (axioms) “are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to verification or falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts.”[xiii] Mises continues, “A fashionable tendency in contemporary philosophy is to deny the existence of any a priori knowledge. All human knowledge, it is contended, is derived from experience.”[xiv]
According to Long, Rand objected to this idea of a priori knowledge in her marginalia of her copy of Human Action. “There is no ‘a priori’ knowledge,” Rand insisted in the margins; “[t]here is no knowledge not derived from experience” (Rand 1995a, 113–14).”[xv]
Long admits that Rand ultimately bases her axioms on reality while Mises does not, but relies on Rand’s explanation of an axiom as “a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it.”
Long argues that Rand’s definition of axioms is the same as Mises’ a priori. Long admits that Rand ultimately bases her axioms on reality while Mises does not, but relies on Rand’s explanation of an axiom as “a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it.”[xvi]
According to praxeology the attempt to deny the action axiom necessarily means that you are acting towards a purpose. While it might be true that the person arguing against the action axiom is taking action toward a goal, it is not true that a person having a seizure is taking ‘conscious actions toward chosen goals’. A person in an abusive relationship suffering from ‘battered person syndrome’ is not engaged in conscious actions toward chosen goals. Advocates of praxeology might argue that the abused person feels responsible for the abuse they are suffering and therefore they are working toward the goal of relieving their guilt. Any impartial observer would say that the abused person’s actions are not working toward relieving their guilt or getting out the abusive relationship. In economics it is at least an open question whether the idea of unintended consequences fits the action axiom. In that case the result obtained was not those the person(s) was striving for.
Note, Rand says that an axiom requires a person to accept it in any attempt to deny it. Arguing that person having a seizure is not engaged in conscious actions toward chosen goals, does not mean that they have accepted the action axiom.
Another part of Mises’ action axiom is, human action is necessarily always rational. According to Mises, “the term ‘rational action’ is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such. When applied to the ultimate ends of action, the terms rational and irrational are inappropriate and meaningless.”[xvii] Mises further states, “however one twists things, one will never succeed in formulating the notion of ‘irrational’ action whose ‘irrationality’ is not founded upon an arbitrary judgment of value.”[xviii]
This is a clear contradiction between Rand and Mises on an epistemological and ethical level. This is not a minor disagreement, but goes to the very fundamentals of Mises’ praxeology and Objectivism. Long however argues that this is not the case. “Mises of course did not mean that people always pursue the most rationally defensible ends (for Mises there are no such things) or even that, given their ends, people always choose the most rationally defensible means to their ends. In part, what he meant was simply that human action is purposeful.”[xix] According to Long, when Mises says people always act rationally, he means “in a manner appropriate to their situation in the way of actually seeing it that is constitutive of their action. And this is a claim that Rand has no reason to reject”[xx]
Rand defines reason as, “reason integrates man’s perceptions by means of forming abstractions or conceptions, thus raising man’s knowledge from the perceptual level, which he shares with animals, to the conceptual level, which he alone can reach. The method which reason employs in this process is logic—and logic is the art of non-contradictory identification.”[xxi] Thus for Rand, to act rationally is to act in accordance with reason. This does not include all purposeful actions. Hitler acted purposively to kill off the Jews, but this action cannot be considered rational according to Rand.
All the massaging of what Rand and Mises meant cannot reconcile these two radically different positions. While English was Mises’ second language, his ideas about praxeology were fundamental and Mises never retracted his statements or reinterpreted them and neither did Rand. An informal review of video lectures by Austrian Economists shows that they take Mises at his word. It is very dangerous to reinterpret what people are saying.
Mises is clear that praxeology is a type of philosophical rationalism.
“[Praxeology’s] cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and particular features of the actual case. Its statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori.” Mises, Human Action, p. 32
“All theorems of economics are necessarily valid in every instance in which all the assumptions presupposed are given.” Mises, Human Action, p. 66
“Apart from the fact that these conclusions cannot be “tested” by historical or statistical means, there is no need to test them since their truth has already been established. Historical fact enters into these conclusions only by determining which branch of the theory is applicable in any particular case.” Murray N. Rothbard https://mises.org/library/praxeology-methodology-austrian-economics.
Philosophical rationalism is defined as “the doctrine that reason alone is a source of knowledge and is independent of experience.”[xxii] Philosophical rationalism is commonly associated with Descartes and Spinoza. Here is what Rand said about rationalism.[Philosophers came to be divided] into two camps: those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge of the world by deducing it exclusively from concepts, which come from inside his head and are not derived from the perception of physical facts (the Rationalists)—and those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts (the Empiricists).[xxiii]
Mises’ epistemology is not science. At a minimum science always requires that concepts (hypothesis) are checked against reality and reality is ultimate determiner of what is true. William Thomas, Director of Programs at The Atlas Society, argues that Mises was not a philosophical rationalist and shows that some of the concepts Mises uses, such as money, can only be derived from experience. This is another attempt to massage the words of Mises. What this shows is that Mises’ praxeology and his ideas about money result in a logical contradiction. Rand’s response from Atlas Shrugged might be “contradictions do not exist. Whenever you think that you are facing a contradiction, check your premises. You will find that one of them is wrong.”
An interesting point is that Mises’ subjective theory of value is fundamental to his ideas on praxeology. “Let us note that praxeology does not assume that a person’s choice of values or goals is wise or proper . . . “[xxiv] “However one twists things, one will never succeed in formulating the notion of ‘irrational’ action whose ‘irrationality’ is not founded upon an arbitrary judgment of value.”[xxv] As a result, it is impossible to separate the subjective theory of value from Mises praxeology.
George Reisman makes some important point about Mises’ contention that economics (science) should be value-free.
The notion that science and value should be divorced is utterly contradictory. It itself expresses a value judgment in its very utterance. And it is not only self-contradictory, but contradictory of the most cherished principles of science as well. Science itself is built on a foundation of values that all scientists are logically obliged to defend: values such as reason, observation, truth, honesty, integrity, and the freedom of inquiry. In the absence of such values, there could be no science. The leading historical illustration of the truth of these propositions is the case of Galileo and the moral outrage which all lovers of science and truth must feel against those who sought to silence him. [xxvi]
F.A. Hayek’s epistemological ideas are contained in his ideas on “cultural evolution.” Hayek was proud of his ideas on cultural evolution and considered them central to his ideas on economics. “The theory (cultural evolution), of which Hayek himself was proud, is on all accounts central to his economic, social, and political project”[xxvii]
Cultural evolution is the idea that social institutions, such ethics, law, and economic systems are created by a non-rational evolutionary process. “According to this theory, rules, norms and practices evolve in a process of natural selection operating at the level of the group. Thus, groups that happen to have more efficient rules and practices tend to grow, multiply, and ultimately displace other groups.”[xxviii]
Bruce Caldwell describes cultural evolution as:
The term “cultural evolution” refers to the evolution of a tradition of learnt rules, norms, ethical precepts, and practices, “especially those dealing with several property, honesty, contract, exchange, trade, competition, gain, and privacy” (Hayek 1988:12). This cultural heritage emerged through “a process of winnowing and sifting, directed by the differential advantages gained by groups from practices adopted for some unknown and perhaps purely accidental reasons” (Hayek 1979:155). The traditions and institutions that resulted allowed the development of a vast extended order, one capable of sustaining huge increases in population, an order that would have been considered fantastical to earlier humans existing under more primitive conditions.[xxix]
According to Hayek, no individual is capable of using reason to determine which social institution will end up with the best result beforehand or why a particular set of social norms does work well. Linda C. Raeder in Humantis makes this point and also points out that David Hume’s ideas entered the mainstream libertarian movement through Hayek.
“The picture of man as a being who, thanks to his reason, can rise above the values of civilization, in order to judge it from the outside . . . is an illusion.” For Hayek, morals, values, and reason are entirely natural phenomena, evolutionary adaptations which have enabled man to survive and flourish in his particular kind of world.
Perhaps no other area of Burke’s and Hayek’s thought is as congruent as their understanding of the role of reason in human affairs; their views are so close as to suggest that Hayek’s thought on this issue is merely an elaboration, although quite an extensive one, of Burke’s theme. Hayek developed several of Burke’s most crucial insights: 1) the priority of social experience (or “tradition”) over reason; 2) the notion that inherited social institutions embody a “superindividual wisdom” which transcends that available to the conscious reasoning mind; and 3) the impotence of reason to ‘design’ a viable social order.[xxx]
David Kelley elaborates on this point:
Hayek, by contrast, is a critic of what he calls ―constructive rationalism. His concept of rationalism is somewhat idiosyncratic, and is not equivalent to Rand‘s conception of reason. Nevertheless, it leads him to claim that ―no universally valid system of ethics can ever be known to us, which is obviously not consistent with her view. For Hayek, moral rules have a status lying ―between instinct and reason.
Is Hayek anti-reason? It’s hard to say, however arguing that reason is fundamentally limited (as opposed to making a mistake) in understanding reality without any real evidence is an attack on reason itself. Like Hume, Hayek cannot say reason is completely impotent, because what would be the point of writing. Writing presumes some ability to reason.
Hayek’s case for freedom is based on the limits of reason. In order for Hayek’s cultural evolution to work, you cannot substitute the decisions of a single leader (or small group) for those of the masses. To do so undermines the evolutionary process. As David Kelley explains:
This case for market freedom is essentially negative. Hayek seems to think that if socialist planning were possible, socialism might be the morally ideal system. But the inescapable ignorance of would-be planners excludes that possibility: ―If there were omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the attainment of our present wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little case for liberty.
As David Kelley explains:This [Hayek’s] case for market freedom is essentially negative. Hayek seems to think that if socialist planning were possible, socialism might be the morally ideal system.
Hayek does not think that reason can tell you how or why social institutions, including the law and ethics work. This is totally inconsistent Rand’s ideas and undermines the very idea of science.
Interestingly, Hayek’s position on ‘the subjective theory or value’ is a fundamental part of his epistemology, just like Mises’. His cultural evolution requires that we cannot formulate a rational ethics because that would undermine the evolutionary process. As a result, every ethical system is subjective and therefore so is every law. The most we can do is put our faith in the process and blindly hope our ethical and legal systems are better than they were in the past because of the evolutionary process of cultural evolution.
Economics vs. Philosophy
It is clear that Austrian Economics’ epistemological positions are incompatible with Objectivism and science more generally. However it is entirely possible that despite this, Austrian Economics has achieved great things in economics. For instance, David Kelley has shown that John Locke made a number of epistemological errors with respect to perception, in his book The Evidence of the Senses, and yet Locke’s ideas on Natural Rights are still profound and fundamentally sound.
In this case however, when Objectivists and Austrians are talking they are not even speaking the same language. For instance, when Rand says she is for capitalism, she means “a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights”[xxxi] By individual rights, Rand means a moral claim based on man’s nature and discovered using reason. Austrians do not think that a rational ethics is possible. As a result, to Austrians, capitalism is an economic system that has low levels of governmental interference, based on some utilitarian criteria. (You cannot live without an ethical system, so most Austrians default to utilitarianism)
When Objectivists talk about property rights, they mean an ethical claim to take action with respect to something, such as land. This ethical claim is based on a rational, natural rights system. When Austrians talk about “property rights”, they do not really mean a “right” in any way except a purely arbitrary legal claim. Austrians argument for “property rights” is a purely utilitarian or historical argument (Hayek) that can be fudged to meet the utilitarian goal or historical precedence.
These differences result in real differences in economic policy. Menger, for instance, advocated 1) public works constructed by the state such as roads, railways and canals, 2) government-established agricultural and vocational training institutions, 3) state intervention to stop clearing of forests on private property in the mountains of Austria when this clearing had serious and bad effects on agriculture, and 4) government intervention to stop child labour.[xxxii] Hayek was in favor of social security, some sort of government provided health care, emergency government assistance for natural disasters, and suggested that manipulating the money supply might be used to alleviate recessions/depressions.[xxxiii]
Even Ludwig Von Mises waffles on economic policies that are inconsistent with capitalism as an Objectivist would define it.
There are certainly cases in which people may consider definite restrictive measures as justified. Regulations concerning fire prevention are restrictive and raise the cost of production. But the curtailment of total output they bring about is the price to be paid for avoidance of greater disaster. The decision about each restrictive measure is to be made on the ground of a meticulous weighing of the costs to be incurred and the prize to be obtained. No reasonable man could possibly question this rule.[xxxiv]
Note that Mises justification for fire regulations is based on utilitarianism, which Rand condemns as “’the greatest good for the greatest number’ is one of the most vicious slogans ever foisted on humanity.”[xxxv]
The Austrians sound a lot more like modern conservatives than capitalists. When it is a government policy that Austrians are in favor of, they are quite happy to override peoples’ individual rights. They just want these programs to be run more efficiently. Austrians make a number of errors in their analysis of the economy as well, however, that is a topic for another paper.
Austrians often argue that if you do not support the Austrian school of economics then which school (economists) do your support then, as if this was an election or a smorgasbord with a limited choice. Science is a creative endeavor and we are not limited only by the existing choices.
New Growth Economics’ central point is that wealth is created by the human mind. This should be exciting to Objectivists, because that sounds very much like Ayn Rand. It also points to an objective basis for economics. Every human needs to acquire and consume a minimum number of calories or they die.[xxxvi] This provides an objective standard that is very similar to Rand’s standard for her ethics. It also ties economics to biology, particularly human biology, just like Rand tied her ethics to biology.
Inventions are the result of applying man’s reasoning power to the objective problems of life. The way we become wealthier is by increasing our level of technology. I explain this in more detail in my book, Source of Economic Growth; in my Savvy Street article, entitled ‘Inventing at the Intersection of Biology and Economics’; and did so in my 2015 & 2016 talks at Atlas Summit.
All species are biologically designed to spend most of their existence on the edge of starvation. The fact that human beings, starting around 1800, were the first species to permanently escape this condition, needs a profound answer based on man’s unique nature, his ability to reason.
I would like to thank Ed Younkins for his encouragement and support. However, the positions in the paper are mine along and any errors are mine alone.
[i] Richard C.B. Johnsson, The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol.6 no. 2 Spring 2005 pages 317-335.
Subjectivism, Intricism, and Apriorism,:Rand Among the Austrians, Penn State University Press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41560286.pdf.
[iii] Edward W. Younkins, The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol.6 no. 2 Spring 2005 pages 337-374, Menger, Mises, Rand, and Beyond, Centenary Symposium, Part II Ayn Rand Among the Austrians, http://quebecoislibre.org/younkins28.pdf
[v] Edward W. Younkins, The Road to Objective Economics: Hayek Takes a Wrong Turn, http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Younkins/The_Road_to_Objective_Economics_Hayek_Takes_a_Wrong_Turn.shtml
[vi]https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Investigations%20into%20the%20Method%20of%20the%20Social%20Sciences_5.pdf , INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS
[vii]https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Investigations%20into%20the%20Method%20of%20the%20Social%20Sciences_5.pdf , INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS, Introduction, p. xi.
[viii]https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Investigations%20into%20the%20Method%20of%20the%20Social%20Sciences_5.pdf , INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS, Introduction, p. xiii, Lawrence H. White.
[ix] Edward W. Younkins, The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol.6 no. 2 Spring 2005 pages 337-374, Menger, Mises, Rand, and Beyond, Centenary Symposium, Part II Ayn Rand Among the Austrians, http://quebecoislibre.org/younkins28.pdf
[x] Wikipedia, Analytic–Synthetic Distinction, Accessed October 21, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction.
[xi] Kant’s noumenal/phenomenal distinction is restatement of Plato, in which there is a realm of forms (ideas) and the imperfect world we live in.
[xii] Murray N. Rothbard, “Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics”, https://mises.org/library/praxeology-methodology-austrian-economics
[xiii] Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action, p. 32, https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Human%20Action_3.pdf
[xiv] Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action, p. 32, https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Human%20Action_3.pdf
[xvii] Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action, 1.I.32, http://www.econlib.org/library/Mises/HmA/msHmA1.html
[xviii] Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action, The Scholar’s Edition, p. 104.& https://mises.org/library/what-do-austrians-mean-rational , What Do Austrians Mean by “Rational”?, MISES DAILY ARTICLES, Accessed 6/9/16.
[xxiii] “For the New Intellectual,” For the New Intellectual, 30, http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/rationalism_vs_empiricism.html.
[xxiv] Murray N. Rothbard, “Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics”, https://mises.org/library/praxeology-methodology-austrian-economics
[xxv] Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action, The Scholar’s Edition, p. 104.& https://mises.org/library/what-do-austrians-mean-rational , What Do Austrians Mean by “Rational”?, MISES DAILY ARTICLES, Accessed 6/9/16.
[xxvi] George Reisman, Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics, p. 36, http://www.capitalism.net/Capitalism/CAPITALISM_Internet.pdf.
[xxvii] Erik Angner, The History of Hayek’s Theory of Cultural Evolution, p. 3, http://institutoamagi.org/download/Angner-Erik-The-history-of-Hayeks-Theory-of-cultural-Evolution.pdf.
[xxviii] Erik Angner, The History of Hayek’s Theory of Cultural Evolution, p. 3, http://institutoamagi.org/download/Angner-Erik-The-history-of-Hayeks-Theory-of-cultural-Evolution.pdf.
[xxix] Bruce Caldwell , The Emergence of Hayek’s Ideas on Cultural Evolution, p. 6, http://www.gmu.edu/depts/rae/archives/VOL13_1_2000/caldwell.pdf.
[xxx] Linda C. Raeder, The Liberalism/Conservatism Of Edmund Burke and F. A. Hayek: A Critical Comparison, HUMANITAS, Volume X, No. 1, 1997. National Humanities Institute, http://www.nhinet.org/raeder.htm.
[xxxii] Social Democracy For The 21st Century: A Realist Alternative To The Modern Left, http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.mx/2012/08/rescuing-menger-from-austrians.html, accessed October 23, 2016.
[xxxiii] Nicholas Wapshott, Hayek on health care, social safety nets and public housing (quoting from Road to Serfdom) https://sites.google.com/site/wapshottkeyneshayek/hayek-on-health-care-social-safety-nets-and-public-housing accessed October 23, 2016.
[xxxiv] Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action, The Scholar’s Edition, p. 741, https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Human%20Action_3.pdf.
[xxxv] Textbook of Americanism,” The Ayn Rand Column, 90, http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/utilitarianism.html.
[xxxvi] Calories make a convenient catch all for all human requirements including air, water, micronutrients etc.